Over 150 potentially low-value health care practices: an Australian study Elshaug AG, Watt AM, Mundy L, Willis CD Med J Aust 2012; 197 (10): 556-560 Notes Another addition to the conversation on low value services and unnecessary care. This article gives the Australian perspective, following recent coverage of international low-value reduction campaigns from the UK and the US, and pressure from many angles to deploy limited health care resources more effectively. One major challenge in this is the development of a transparent and systematic method to identify services for review. In 2010 the Australian Government introduced a Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) Quality Framework, subsequently named the Comprehensive Management Framework for the MBS (CMF), to improve management and governance of the MBS and conduct ongoing reviews of MBS items. As part of the development of the CMF, the authors conducted this systematic review to identify non-pharmaceutical, MBS-listed health care services that were flagged as potentially unsafe, ineffective or otherwise inappropriately applied. They also used this review to develop and apply a new strategy for scanning sources to identify such services of 'questionable benefit' for further investigation. This article outlines their approach and methods, and gives the results of their strategy. Their review identified 156 potentially ineffective or unsafe services which warrant consideration of removal from the MBS. These include arthroscopic surgery for knee osteoarthritis, imaging in cases of low back pain, and surgery for obstructive sleep apnoea. 
Notes
A pair of items on surgical error and ways of analysing and reducing them. The first paper reports on an analysis of 153 cases from three years' of one US teaching hospital's surgical M&M (morbidity and mortality) conferences. Using a form of root cause analysis (RCA) the project sought to identify common underlying issues. The authors classified the majority of preventable errors as resulting from 'disorganised care', these included diagnostic errors, failure to rescue, and lack of situational awareness. The second paper has similar aims in seeking to understand causes of 'incorrect surgery' and how to use such knowledge. In this instance the setting is the US Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The VHA implemented a process for sharing de-identified stories of surgical lessons learned. This paper's study surveyed Chiefs of Surgery in the VHA to understand the awareness and impact of the lessons learned. The types of examples of adverse events included wrong eye implants, incorrect nerve blocks, and wrong site excisions of lesions. These were accompanied by human factors recommendations and change concepts such as designing the system to prevent mistakes, using differentiation, minimising handovers, and standardising how information is communicated. The majority of the respondents to the survey (87%) reported they were valuable and 85% that they changed or reinforced patient safety behaviours in their facility as a result of surgical lessons learned. The authors assert that "Simply having a policy will not ensure patient safety. When reviewing adverse events, human factors must be considered as a cause for error and for the failure to follow policy without assigning blame. VHA surgeons reported that the surgery lessons learned were valuable and impacted practice." Much of the literature on high-performing systems notes that self-learning and selfimprovements are key and common features of such systems. 
